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Abstract―Power plant operation and plant aging influence 
plant reliability, strategy, and cost maintenance of PLTGU 
Block 1 Muara Karang. Several approach has been done to 
increase maintenance effectiveness as well as reducing it cost. 
Nevertheless, other strategies are necessary to be further 
developed adopting best practices in industries. In this study, we 
used Risk Based Inspection (RBI) method to evaluate scope of 
inspection on equipment in the HRSG 1.1 Muara Karang. 
Equipment has been investigated are pressure vessel, heat 
exchanger tube, and piping. The number of equipment under 
investigated are 26, where 10 equipments included in the 
medium risk category and 16 equipments included in the low 
risk category. There are 2 equipments where the inspection time 
interval is ≤ 2 years i.e. high pressure superheater 1 & 2. 
 
Keywords―Power Plant Operation, Cost Reduction, Risk 
Based Inspection, Risk Analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
The Muara Karang Block 1 power plant is located in 
North Jakarta. The power plant is a combined cycle power 
plant consists of 3 gas turbines, 3 heat recovery steam 
generators (HRSG) and 1 steam turbine. This unit has been 
producing for 23 years, and now the power plant operation 
is as a peaker unit (production during peak load condition). 
With the current operating conditions, it is possible to 
reduce the risk of material quality and equipment life. 
Especially in materials or equipment affected by 
temperature or pressure differences. It could be seen from 
the condition of the equipment at the time of inspection, 
e.g. crack on LP drum separator, and leaks in some tubes in 
HRSG. With these findings, it is potential to affect the total 
cost and duration of inspection.  
Under these conditions, we need a method to evaluate and 
ensure maintenance of the existing strategy is appropriate 
or necessary to add as well as pointed the scope of 
inspection. In the present study, we used Risk Based 
Inspection (RBI) method to evaluate the scope of inspection 
on equipment in the HRSG 1.1 Muara Karang. The 
author[1] discusses the use of RBI methodology for 
evaluating maintenance strategies in industrial processes. 
Among the opportunities and impacts of the occurrence of a 
failure each was investigated with a risk analysis. All 
equipment in unit is evaluated and categorized into 5 risk 
zones based on the RBI results. The author[2] designs a 
maintenance strategy based on the use of Risk Based 
Maintenance (RBM) method. Using this methodology, we 
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can estimate the cause of the risk of an unexpected failure 
as a function of probability of failure (PoF) or the impact of 
failure (CoF). Maintenance for this equipment is prioritized 
based on the level of risk of the equipment, so the 
maintenance strategy is based on reducing overall risk 
value of an equipment. 
II. METHOD 
The calculation of risk in the Risk-Based Inspection 
(RBI) methodology involves the determination of a 
probability of failure combined with the consequence of 
failure. Failure in American Petroleum Institute 581 is 
defined as a loss of containment from the pressure 
boundary resulting in leakage to the atmosphere or rupture 
of a pressurized component. As damage accumulates in a 
pressurized component during in-service operation the risk 
increases. At some point, a risk tolerance or risk target is 
exceeded and an inspection is recommended of sufficient 
effectiveness to better quantify the damage state of the 
component. The inspection action itself does not reduce the 
risk; however, it does reduce uncertainty thereby allowing 
better quantification of the damage present in the 
component[3]. 
The API RBI methodology may be used to manage the 
overall risk of a plant by focusing inspection efforts on the 
process equipment with the highest risk. API RBI provides 
the basis for managing risk by making an informed decision 
on inspection frequency, level of detail, and types of NDE. 
In most plants, a large percent of the total unit risk will be 
concentrated in a relatively small percent of the equipment 
items. These potential high risk components may require 
greater attention, perhaps through a revised inspection plan. 
As per definition in[3], risk in defined as following 
equation (1): 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑥𝑥 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (1) 
A. Probability of Failure (POF) 
The probability of failure used in API RBI is computed 
from Equation (2). 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (2) 
The probability of failure 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡), is determined as the 
product of a generic failure frequency, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, a damage 
factor, 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡), and a management systems factor, 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. 
1) Generic failure frequency (gff) 
The general failure frequency of a component is estimated 
using records from all factories within a company or from 
various factories within an industry, from literature sources, 
and general commercial reliability data. Frequency of 
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failure is generally intended to be a representative 
frequency of failure of the quality degradation experienced 
during operation in a specific environment, and shown for 
some hole sizes on the types of equipment. 
2) Damage factor (Df (t)) 
Damage factor is a factor based on the damage 
mechanism that occurs. There are several examples of 
damage mechanisms such as thinning, stress corrosion 
cracking, high temperature hydrogen attack, and 
mechanical fatigue. Not all of these damage factors are 
used in calculations when analyzing the probability of a 
device failure. API 581 provides screening criteria for 
application of these damage factors. In addition, the 
damage factor is also determined as a function of the 
effectiveness of inspection. In this research the damage 
mechanism is combined with flow accelerated corrosion 
(FAC). Mechanism of damage caused by FAC (flow 
accelerated corrosion) occurs when carbon steel 
components are degraded due to the presence of flowing 
water or water vapor with oxygen content dissolved therein. 
When water or water vapor flows in a carbon steel material, 
the oxide layer on the surface (usually Fe3O4) dissolves 
into a flowing stream thinning the pipe wall over time. In 
combined cycle plants, FAC has been the leading cause of 
HRSG tube failures (HTF) over the last 10 years and 
represents about 35–40 % of all HTFs. Both single- and 
two-phase FAC can occur in low pressure (LP) evaporator 
and economizer tubing but again there are no decent 
statistics which separate the two. Two-phase FAC has also 
been a problem in LP evaporator drum steam separation 
equipment[4]. 
3) Management system factor (FMS) 
Management System factors (FMS) calculates the effect of 
management system facilities on equipment integrity 
systems in an industry. This factor consider the probability 
of failure is accumulation of damage that results a reduction 
strength will be known based on time and directly 
proportional to the quality of equipment integrity facility 
program. This factor is derived from an evaluation between 
an existing management system facility or an operating unit 
that affects factory or industry risks. 
B. Consequence of Failure (COF) 
The analysis of consequences or impact of occurrence of 
failure on API 581 is expressed in two categories, which 
affect the area and on finance. The consequences for the 
area can be seen in equation 3 as follows. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑏𝑏 (3) 
Where variables a and b in equation 3 are fluid references 
that are released or exposed and can be seen in[5] table 5.2. 
While X itself is the rate of release or exposure if the 
release is steady state and continuous, or X is the mass or 
amount of fluid released or exposed if the fluid being 
released or exposed is considered instantaneously. The 
consequences on costs can be seen in equation 4. 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (4) 
Where the consequences of costs are affected by the 
consequences of replacement or repair of components, 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, cost of loss of production, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 , cost of accidents, 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, cost of damage to equipment or components around 
it, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎, and cost of environmental pollution, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. In 
this study the consequences that affect are cost of loss of 
production or occur derating, cost of accidents, cost of 
damage to equipment or components around it and cost of 
damage to equipment or components. The cost of influence 
on the environment is not quantified because the fluids in 
HRSG do not include flammable and toxic fluids. 
After the probability of failure and the consequences of 
failure are known, put into equation 1 to search risk 
categories for each equipment. After that, display it in the 
risk matrix, and make inspection schedules and scope of 
inspection work to mitigate these risks. 
C. Case Study 
As described above, in this study the equipment 
investigated in the RBI application is pressure vessel and 
heat exchanger tube equipment in HRSG 1.1 Muara 
Karang. The RBI concept refers to the API 581 standard, 
where the frequency of common failures and procedures 
determining the damage factor of each damage mechanisms 
is provided. Mechanism of damage done in this research is 
thinning, SCC Amine Cracking, CUI, HTHA, and FAC. 
Screening mechanism for damage mechanism can be seen 
in[3] page 5.2, 8.3, 17.3, and 20.3. The table 1 shown of 
screening criteria for Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC). 
The value of generic failure frequency for High Pressure - 
Low Pressure Drum equipment, heat exchanger tubes, and 
steam line can be seen in[3] table 4.1. HRSG equipment 
specifications that will be inspected can be seen in Table 2 
as follows. 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Based on data above then put in the calculation based on 
the procedures that have been provided in American 
Petroleum Institute (API) 581. Table 3 shown some of 
result selected the highest and lowest risk category. 
Table 1 Probability of Failure, Damage Factor, 
Consequence of Failure and Risk Ranking for each HRSG 
Equipment selected the highest and lowes risk category 
From the table above for heat exchanger tube equipment 
no calculation of the consequences of failure, this is 
because according to the reference/procedure of API 581, 
where for heat exchanger tube the consequence of failure 
calculated is only based on cost consequences. From the 
results of these calculations it is known there are 10 
equipment that are included in the medium risk and 16 
equipment that include into low risk. 
Based on the RBI concept, follow up for equipment 
included in the low risk category is only monitored. For 
equipment included in the medium risk category more 
focused follow-up is conducted, i.e. by determining the 
next inspection schedule. According to API 581 the 
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inspection scheduling for pressure vessel, heat exchanger 
tube, and piping is based on the results of the risk obtained, 
but the interval itself is not given a definite calculation, 
since API 581 submits the inspection scheduling to the 
appliance owner according to the risk limit accepted by the 
owner. The author[6] determines the inspection schedule 
based on the level of risk and also the mechanism of 
damage that occurs in the tool and described in equation 5 
as follows. 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 = 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 × 𝐶𝐶 × 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 (5) 
In the equation next inspection schedule, NID, is 
determined as a product of the effectiveness of the 
inspection, Ief, Confidence rating, C, and service life, RL. 
The value of inspection effectiveness is 0 - 1, the value is 
based on the category of the effectiveness of inspection. 
While the value of confidence rating is taken based on the 
risk level of less than 0.5 for a high risk level and more than 
0.5 for a low risk level.  
From the results of calculations for 10 equipment that are 
included in the medium risk category, there are 2 
equipment where the next inspection schedule is ≤ 2 years 
and 8 other equipment ≥ 10 years. After being known the 
next inspection schedule of each equipment next step in 
risk mitigation efforts is to determine the scope of job 
inspection in this case is an assessment. In API 581 
inspection effectiveness is very influential to the value of 
damage factor, so the risk mitigation to decrease the risk 
level is with the inspection schedule and level or category 
of inspection. For 10 equipment included in the medium 
risk category the scope of job inspection carried out is the 
UT thickness, radiography, and in situ metallography at ≥ 
50% of the surface area of the equipment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From the results of this study the concept of RBI can be 
applied to pressure vessel equipment, heat exchanger tube 
and piping on HRSG. The RBI concept can be used as a 
comparison in determining maintenance policies. When the 
RBI implementation is done properly, the RBI concept 
helps in improving security and reduces inspection and 
maintenance costs on power plant units. 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk Matrix HRSG Equipment. 
 
TABLE 1. 
SCREENING CRITERIA FOR FLOW ACCELERATED CORROSION (FAC) 
Damage Factor Screening Criteria 
FAC If the component’s material of construction is carbon or low alloy steel and the process environment contains oxygen at pH > 7.5 in any concentration, then the component should be evaluated for susceptibility to FAC 
TABLE 2. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF HRSG EQUIPMENT 
No Equipment OD (In) Thickness (mm) T Operasi (C) P Operasi (psi) Flow Rate (lbs) Material 
1 LP Economizer 1.25197 3.2 43.26 376.127 415483 ST35.8/I 
2 LP Eco Inlet Header 6.62598 6.3 46.18 387.004 415483 ST35.8/I 
3 LP Eco Outlet Header 6.62598 6.3 153.35 403.06 415483 ST35.8/I 
4 LP Drum 94.4882 18 161.9 94.129 390866 ST 41KT 
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5 Deaerator 86.6142 12 42.3 307.48 390866 ST 41KT 
6 LP Inlet header evaporator 6.62598 10 187.96 174.045 28020 ST35.8/I 
7 LP Outlet Header Evap 6.62598 12.5 187.96 174.045 28020 ST35.8/I 
8 LP Evap Tubes 1.25197 2.6 187.96 174.045 28020 ST35.8/I 
9 LP SH Tubes 1.49606 2.6 319.74 96.493 91249 ST35.8/I 
10 LP Inlet header SH 10.748 10 319.74 96.493 91249 ST35.8/I 
11 LP outlet header SH 14 12.5 319.74 96.493 91249 ST35.8/I 
12 LP Steam Line 14 8 319.74 96.493 91249 ST35.8/I 
13 HP Eco Tubes 1.25197 3.2 286.97 1031.655 102603 ST35.8/III 
14 HP Eco Inlet Header 6.62598 16 286.97 1031.655 102603 ST35.8/III 
15 HP Eco Outlet Header 6.62598 16 286.97 1031.655 102603 ST35.8/III 
16 HP Drum 82.6772 60 292.2 1114.617 104565 15NiCuMoNb5 
17 HP Eva Tubes 1.25197 3.2 292.4 1117.706 109305 ST35.8/III 
18 HP Eva Inlet Header 14 30 292.4 1117.706 10930 15Mo3 
19 HP Eva Outlet Header 14 30 292.4 1117.706 109305 15Mo4 
20 HP SH 1 Tubes 1.25197 3.2 468.56 1089.757 195285 13 Cr Mo 44 
21 HP SH 2 Tubes 1.25197 4 480.76 1057.181 253752 10 Cr Mo 910 
22 HP SH 1 Inlet Header 10.748 25 458.32 1107.22 163957 15Mo3 
23 HP SH 1 Outlet Header 12.752 30 474.43 1064.288 240987 10 Cr Mo 910 
24 HP SH 2 Inlet Header 12.752 32 480.76 1057.181 253752 13 Cr Mo 44 
25 HP SH 2 Outlet Header 14 32 523.57 1035.861 292024 X 10 Cr Mo VNb91 
26 HP Steam Line 10.748 28 523.57 1035.861 292024 10 Cr Mo 910 
TABLE 3. 
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE, DAMAGE FACTOR, CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE AND RISK RANKING FOR EACH HRSG EQUIPMENT SELECTED THE HIGHEST 
AND LOWES RISK CATEGORY 
 
Equipment DF Total Pof CA final (ft2) FC final ($) Prob Category (range) CA (ft2) FC ($) 
LP Economizer Tube 20.379 0.0006 - 190023.1 3 - C 
LP Inlet header evaporator 20.379 0.0006 1924 129087.9 3 C C 
LP Inlet header SH 6.5948 0.0002 444 75859.87 2 B B 
HP Drum 21.379 0.0007 782 206150.4 3 B C 
HP SH 1 Tubes 8.5948 0.0035 - 138217.8 2 - C 
HP SH 2 Tubes 15.595 0.0035 - 138217.8 2 - C 
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